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Abstract
This paper will introduce the notion of a naming convention and use this paradigm to both develop a new version of the Second
Incompleteness Theorem and to describe when an axiom system can partially evade the Second Incompleteness Theorem.
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1. Introduction
The Second Incompleteness Theorem states that no consistent axiom system is able to verify its own consistency
when it attains a sufficient level of strength. Our objective will be to explore the generality and boundary-case
exceptions for this effect under a class of axiom systems that fail to recognize successor as a total function and
instead treat addition and multiplication as 3-way relations. (These formalisms cannot prove that ∀ x∃ y x + 1 = y.)
Instead, they will recognize the existence of an infinite collection of integers 0, 1, 2, . . . by using an infinite number
of constant symbols C0, C1, C2, . . ..
We will use the term “Naming Convention” to refer to a particular scheme for assigning integer values to named
constant symbols. It will turn out that our ability to either generalize the Second Incompleteness Theorem or to find
boundary-case exceptions to it will depend on the choice of naming method.
For simplicity, all our naming conventions will assign the values of 0, 1 and 2 to the first three constant symbols
of C0, C1 and C2. For i ≥ 3, our Incremental, Additive and Multiplicative Naming Conventions will use the
three different identities, specified by Eqs. (1)–(3), to define Ci ’s value recursively in terms of Ci−1’s value. A more
formal alternate definition of these naming conventions, that does not use the technically impermissible addition and
multiplication function symbols, will appear in Section 3.
Ci = Ci−1 + 1 (1)
Ci = Ci−1 + Ci−1 (2)
Ci = Ci−1 ∗ Ci−1. (3)
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Integers having no formal names will be constructed from “named integers” via the operations of subtraction and
division. (Thus since 5 = 8 − 2 − 1, the term C4 − C2 − C1 will define 5 under Eq. (2)’s “additive” convention.)
One of our theorems will state that the additive naming convention does allow for some types of unusual boundary-
type exceptions for the Hilbert-styled version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. (A similar result will also
hold for the incremental naming convention by a degenerate and thus somewhat weaker form of Section 4’s overall
formalism.) On the other hand, Theorem 4 will state that every non-trivial, consistent axiom system α, using Eq. (3)’s
multiplicative naming convention, is unable to recognize its own Hilbert consistency. (The result of Theorem 4 differs
from our prior papers [43,45–51] by examining a Hilbert mode of deduction, rather than the cut-free semantic tableaux
deductive method.)
Some added notation is needed to describe our new results more formally. An axiom system α will be henceforth
called Self-Justifying when:
(i) one of α’s theorems will assert α’s consistency (using some reasonable definition of consistency), and
(ii) the axiom system α is in fact consistent.
It is well known [13,15,29] that Kleene’s Fixed Point Theorem implies every r.e. axiom system α can be easily
extended into a broader system α∗ which satisfies condition (i). Kleene’s proposal [15] was essentially for α∗ to
contain all α’s axioms plus the following additional axiom sentence:
# There is no proof of 0=1 from the union of α with “THIS SENTENCE”.
Kleene noted that it was easy to apply the Fixed Point Theorem to formally encode a self-referencing statement,
similar to the sentence # . The catch is that α∗ can be inconsistent even while its added axiom # formally asserts
α∗’s consistency. For this reason, Kleene, Rogers and Jeroslow [13,15,29] each emphatically warned their readers
that most axiom systems similar to α∗ were useless on account of their inconsistency, although they were technically
well-defined. This problem arises in both Go¨del’s paradigm (where α extends Peano Arithmetic), as well as in more
general settings [1–3,5,11,12,22,23,25,28,32,34,42,47].
Our prior research [43,46,51] has developed several examples of self-justifying axiom systems using analogs of
the axiom sentence #, despite these limitations, mostly for the case where an axiom system recognized addition as
a total function and treated multiplication as a 3-way relation that was not provably total. (Thus if M(x, y, z) is a
3-way relation indicating that x ∗ y = z then our axiom systems α were unable to prove ∀x ∀y ∃z M(x, y, z).) In
this context, we illustrated in [43,46,51] how several forms of the Kleene-like self-reflecting axiom # could construct
self-justifying axiom systems under various definitions of semantic tableaux consistency.
The challenge in these articles was to assure the resulting axiom system α∗ did not violate Part-ii of the definition
of self-justification (by being inconsistent — due to a Go¨del-like diagonalization argument — thereby making α∗
useless albeit well-defined — and thus irrelevant). Our articles [43,46,51] showed this difficulty did not plague systems
recognizing solely addition as a total function for some natural definitions of semantic tableaux consistency. On the
other hand, [47] demonstrated the unavailability of this paradigm for circumventing the semantic tableaux version of
the Second Incompleteness when an axiom system recognized multiplication as a total function.
Our goal in the present paper is to explore to what extent the preceding results about semantic tableaux definitions
of consistency will generalize for definitions of consistency under Hilbert-style proof systems. Our research was
stimulated in part by some theorems of Nelson, Pudla´k, Solovay and Wilkie–Paris [21,25,32,42]. In particular, a
formula ϕ(x) is called a Definable Cut for α iff α can prove the theorem:
ϕ(0) AND ∀ x ϕ(x) ⇒ ϕ(x + 1) AND ∀ x ∀ y < x ϕ(x) ⇒ ϕ(y). (4)
Also, let Q denote the well-known axiom system of Tarski–Mostowski–Robinson [36] that recognizes addition
and multiplication as total functions, but contains little information about addition and multiplication beyond that.
Tarski–Mostowski–Robinson [36], showed a generalization of the Go¨del [9] and Rosser [28] versions of the First
Incompleteness Theorem, which they called “Essential Undecidability”, was valid for Q, all its extensions, but
none of its subsets. There have been several examples of generalizations of the Second Incompleteness Theorem
for Q beginning with Bezboruah–Shepherdson’s initial observations [5] on this subject (demonstrating that there
were at least some particularized encodings of the provability predicate under which Q was unable to prove its
own Hilbert Consistency). Wilkie–Paris announced several extensions of the Second Incompleteness Theorem in
[42] — demonstrating for instance that axiom systems as powerful as IΣ0 + Exp are unable to prove the Hilbert
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consistency of formalisms as weak as Q. Pudla´k [25] proved the following new form of the Second Incompleteness
result:
Theorem 1 (Pudla´k 1985). Suppose the consistent axiom system α satisfies α ⊃ Q, ϕ(x) denotes any of Eq. (4)’s
definable cuts, and Contraα(p) denotes any type of Go¨del encoded statement asserting that p represents a Hilbert-
style proof of 0=1 from α. Then α can neither prove a conventional statement recognizing its own Hilbert consistency
nor any weaker theorem of the form: “∀ pϕ(p) ⇒ ¬ Contraα(p)”.
Let us say an axiom system β Canonically Formalizes Arithmetic iff there exists two predicates A(x, y, z) and
M(x, y, z) where β proves:
i. A(x, y, z) is true when x + y = z
ii. M(x, y, z) is true when x ∗ y = z.
During several telephone calls in April of 1994, Robert Solovay communicated to us how the Theorem 1 (by Pudla´k)
could be combined with additional methods due to Nelson and Wilkie–Paris [21,42], to obtain the following result
about canonical formalizations of arithmetic:
Theorem 2 (Solovay’s 1994 Modification [32] of Pudla´k’s 1985 Version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem [25]
using some of the methods of Nelson and Wilkie–Paris [21,42]). Let β denote any consistent axiom system, canonically
formalizing arithmetic, such that:
(A) β is able to prove Eq. (5)’s statement that successor is a total function.
∀ x ∃ z A(x, 1, z). (5)
(B) β is able to prove a Π1 type formatted theorem indicating the A(x, y, z) and M(x, y, z) predicates satisfy the
associative, commutative, distributive and identity-element axioms for addition and multiplication.
Then β must be unable to prove the non-existence of a Hilbert-style proof of 0=1 from β’s set of axioms.
The following two observations will help explain the relationship between the preceding two theorems of Pudla´k and
Solovay:
(1) Let us say that an axiom system β recognizes addition and multiplication as total functions iff it can prove:
∀ x ∀ y ∃ z A(x, y, z) AND ∀ x ∀ y ∃ z M(x, y, z). (6)
Theorem 2 by Solovay is an immediate consequence of the 1985 Theorem 1 by Pudla´k when Eq. (6) is made to
replace Eq. (5)’s formalism in Theorem 2’s hypothesis.
(2) The reason that Solovay had communicated in April of 1994 to us the content of Theorem 2 is that we published
in 1993 a paper [43] which showed that boundary-case exceptions to the semantic tableaux version of the Second
Incompleteness Theorem do exist among axiom systems that recognize addition but not multiplication as a
total function. Our paper [43] thus raised the question whether such boundary-case exceptions to the Second
Incompleteness Theorem can be extended to Hilbert styled proofs under axiom systems that recognize solely
addition as total. Theorem 2 by Solovay is significant because it shows that no such extension is feasible for the
Hilbert-style method of deduction.
A more detailed description of the formalisms that were employed by Theorems 1 and 2 and the related literature
will appear during Section 2’s literature survey. At a first glance, it would certainly appear that Theorem 2 implies no
meaningful axiom system can recognize its own Hilbert consistency — simply because Eq. (5)’s axiom, recognizing
successor as total, is the main threshold for activating Theorem 2’s formalism.
However, it turns out that Theorems 1 and 2 do allow for a subtle form of exception to exist for the Hilbert-styled
version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. This is because Eqs. (2) and (3)’s naming conventions have different
and contrasting characteristics with regards to the Second Incompleteness Theorem (that do not fall under the scope
of either of these two theorems). In particular, one can construct axiom systems α, not recognizing successor as a
total function and employing Eq. (2)’s additive naming convention, which somewhat surprisingly can recognize their
own Hilbert consistency. On the other hand, our Theorem 4 will show no analog of this boundary-type exception to
the Second Incompleteness Theorem is available when a system employs Eq. (3)’s multiplicative naming convention.
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(The point is that neither of these results are predicted by the earlier literature because the prior Theorems 1 and 2
presumed their axiom systems would recognize at least successor as a total function.)
Some added notation will help formalize our new results. Say a function F satisfies a Non-Growth property
iff F(a1, a2, . . . a j ) ≤ Maximum(2, a1, a2, . . . a j ) for all values of a1, a2, . . . a j . Seven examples of non-growth
functions are Integer Subtraction (where x − y is defined to equal 0 when x < y), Division-with-rounding (where
x ÷ y is defined to equal x when y = 0, and it equals 	 xy 
 otherwise), Maximum(x, y), Logarithm(x) = 1 +	Log2x
,
Predecessor(x) = Max(x − 1, 0), Root(x, y) = x1/y and Count(x, j) designating the number of “1” bits among
x’s rightmost j bits. These functions are called the Grounding Functions.
We will use the term Π−1 sentence to refer to a mathematical sentence identical to conventional logic’s Π1
sentence, except that the addition and multiplication function primitives are replaced by the grounding functions
under the definition of a Π−1 sentence. More formally, a Bounded Quantifier is defined as a phrase similar to either
“∀ v ≤ tΨ (v)” or “∃ v ≤ tΨ (v)” where t is a term built out of the grounding function primitives. Let us call a
formula∆−0 when all its quantifiers are bounded, its two relation symbols are “=” and “≤” and it uses the grounding
function symbols. Then Υ will be called Π−1 when it is written in the form ∀v1 ∀v2 . . .∀vnΦ, where Φ is ∆−0 . Using
this terminology, our two main theorems are listed below:
Theorem 3. Let A denote an arbitrary, consistent axiom system (using the grounding function language) all of whose
Π−1 theorems are logically valid under the standard model of the natural numbers. Suppose there also exists a ∆−0
encoding for the predicate HilbPrfA(t, p) — which formally indicates that p is a Hilbert-style proof of the theorem
t from axiom system A. Then there exists a consistent axiom system, called ISCE(A) (which is formally defined in
Section 4), whose constant symbols are defined via the additive naming convention’s methodology and which has an
ability to
i. recognize the validity of all A’s Π−1 theorems,
ii. recognize the assured non-existence of a Hilbert-style proof of 0=1 from its own set of proper axioms.
Theorem 4. No consistent axiom system α is capable of proving a theorem affirming its own Hilbert Consistency
when it (1) contains all the multiplicative naming convention’s axioms, (2) retains an ability to prove all Peano
Arithmetic’s Π−1 theorems, and (3) satisfies a minor additional constraint, which the Definition 1 of Section 5 shall
call the “Concise Encoding” property. (This “Concise Encoding” property is slightly stronger than a requirement that
a ∆−0 predicate identify all α’s axioms.)
Remark 1. A stronger form of Theorem 4, called Theorem 4*, will receive an abbreviated proof in Appendix C.
Theorem 4* will drop Theorem 4’s “Concise Encoding” assumption and also isolate a Π−1 theorem W of Peano
Arithmetic, where no consistent r.e. axiom system α ⊃ W , using the multiplicative naming convention, can formally
verify its own Hilbert consistency.
Theorems 3, 4 and 4* are interesting partly because of their sharply contrasting features — where the simple
replacement of the additive naming convention with a multiplicative convention is sufficient to activate the power of
the Second Incompleteness Theorem.
A second interesting aspect requires some added notation to explain. Let us say a sequence of axioms S1, S2, S3, . . .
defining the constant symbols C1, C2, C3, . . . is Continuously Expanding iff there exists a sequence of constants
K1, K2, K3, . . . with Ki < Ki+1 such that the set of axioms with Go¨del numbers less than Ki is sufficient to generate
a proof of the existence of an integer larger than Ki+1. For example, the additive and multiplicative conventions,
defined by Eqs. (2) and (3), satisfy the continuous expansion property — under the normalized assumption that the
axiom defining Ci has a O(Log(i + 2)) bit-length. On the other hand, Eq. (1)’s incremental naming convention is not
continuously expanding because it grows too slowly.
Ideally, an axiom system α should satisfy the continuous expansion property — even if it fails to recognize
successor as a total function — because the latter feature formalizes at least some type of weak notion of an infinite
growth among integers. This explains the second reason for our interest in Theorems 3 and 4. A degenerate version of
Theorem 3 — with the incremental naming convention replacing the additive method — was established by Theorem
3.4 of [46]. However Theorem 3.4’s axiom systems failed to satisfy the continuous expansion property because they
relied upon the slow growing incremental naming convention. The additive convention will thus represent a useful
compromise between the faster-growing multiplicative convention and the slower incremental convention — whose
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growth rate is simultaneously sufficiently slow to satisfy Theorem 3’s self-justification property while also sufficiently
fast to satisfy the continuous expansion property. This distinction is significant because the terms K1, K2, K3, . . . in
the additive convention’s continuous expansion sequence will grow at a fast super-exponential rate.
One further definition is needed to describe a third theme in this article. Let PredN (x) denote a compound operation
that consists of N iterations of the predecessor function (thereby causing PredN (x) = x − N). Say an axiom system
α is Infinitely Far-Reaching iff there exists a finite subset of axioms S ⊂ α such that for an arbitrary integer N , the
finite set S is sufficient to prove ∃x PredN (x) = 1. Section 6 will outline how it is theoretically possible to construct
an axiom system, which is simultaneously (1) Infinitely Far Reaching, (2) able to verify its own Hilbert consistency,
and (3) able to prove all Peano Arithmetic’s Π−1 theorems.
Section 6’s axiom system will be highly awkward in its internal structure. However, it is noteworthy because one’s
first intuition would be that the combination of the incompleteness effects described by Theorems 1, 2 and 4 would
preclude a formalism from satisfying conditions 1–3 simultaneously.
Overall perspectives and objectives of this article: Any axiom system which fails to recognize successor as a
total function is certainly a mixed blessing, whose weaknesses certainly cannot be overlooked or ignored. However,
Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem beckons one to wonder whether there are any boundary-case circumstances where
the force of the Second Incompleteness Theorem can at least be partially evaded. Theorem 3 and Section 6’s
ISINF(A) formalism will illustrate two types of partially curious forms of self-justifying systems that can be formally
constructed. On the other hand, the prior literature Theorems 1 and 2 and our new Theorems 4 and 7 will indicate that
there is a firm limit as to how far one can strengthen these boundary-case exceptions for the Second Incompleteness
Theorem.
This topic has a different slant than the study of semantic tableaux in [43,45–51] because Theorem 2 (by Solovay)
shows Hilbert-style exceptions to the Second Incompleteness Theorem cannot recognize even successor as a total
function. It thus has a different flavor than the semantic tableaux formalisms of [43,46,48–51], which recognized
addition as a total function.
2. Background literature
Let S(x) denote the “successor” operation that maps the integer x onto x + 1. A formula ϕ(x) is called [11] a
Definable Cut for an axiom system α iff α can prove:
ϕ(0) AND ∀ x ϕ(x) ⇒ ϕ[S(x)] AND ∀ x ∀ y < x ϕ(x) ⇒ ϕ(y). (7)
The articles [1,3,7,8,10,11,14,16,17,21,23–25,27,33,38,39,41,42] have studied definable cuts. This concept is
unrelated to a Gentzen-like “deductive cut rule”.
In a context whereΥ (x) and ϕ(x) denote two definable cuts, the formula ϕ(x) has been called a Thinning ofΥ (x)
(relative to α ) iff α can prove:
∀ x ϕ(x) ⇒ Υ (x). (8)
The symbol Ψ will henceforth denote Ψ ’s Go¨del number, and Prfα,D(t, p) will denote that p is a proof of the
theorem t from the axiom system α using the deduction method D. The system α will be said to recognize its Cut-
Localized D-consistency under ϕ(x) iff α can prove:
∀ p{ϕ(p) ⇒ ¬ Prfα,D(0 = 1, p)}. (9)
The recent literature has sought to identify exactly what triples (ϕ, D, α) have the property that α can prove (9)’s self-
reflecting statement. Both positive and negative results, about the feasibility of constructing such triples have been
established. Below is a summary of some of the recent results:
(1) While GB Set Theory can prove its global Hilbert consistency is equivalent to the global Hilbert consistency of
ZF-Set Theory, Ha´jek, ˇSvejdar and Vopeˇnka [33,41] have shown GB Set Theory cannot verify this equivalence
within the range of every definable cut. In particular, Vopeˇnka–Ha´jek [41] identified a definable cut ϕ where
GB Set Theory can prove the validity of Eq. (9) when D denotes Hilbert deduction and α denotes ZF-set
Theory. Moreover, ˇSvejdar [33] has discussed some important generalizations of this phenomena with regards
to interpretability. (These two results are surprising because Pudla´k [25] has proved that GB Set Theory can
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never prove its Hilbert consistency on any of Eq. (9)’s definable cuts. Thus, GB Theory will view its Hilbert
consistency as equivalent to ZF’s Hilbert consistency in a global sense — but not in a sense localized inside each
definable cut).
(2) In a context where D denotes a second order generalization of Gentzen’s sequent calculus and α is a formalization
of Arithmetic among the natural numbers, Kreisel–Takeuti [19] identified a definable cut where their system
could prove (9)’s statement about its D-consistency.
(3) Nelson [21] demonstrated that a variant of the Tarski–Mostowski–Robinson axiom system Q (with Linear
Ordering) can corroborate Eq. (9)’s statement about its Cut-Localized consistency when D denotes Herbrand
deduction and the cut ϕ is carefully chosen.
(4) Pudla´k proved two results about Eq. (9) in [25]. The first was a substantial generalization of items 2 and 3
(above), which showed that every “sequential” [11] axiom system of finite cardinality can be associated with a
definable cut ϕ such that α can prove Eq. (9) is valid for ϕ when D denotes any cut-free method of deduction.
Theorem 1, mentioned earlier in Section 1, also appeared in Pudla´k’s article [25]. It indicated that no consistent
α ⊃ Q can prove any form of Eq. (9)’s sentence about itself when D denotes Hilbert deduction.
(5) Wilkie–Paris [42] used the theory of definable cuts to prove several new versions of the Second Incompleteness
Theorem in [42]. One of their most surprising results was the demonstration that an axiom system as strong as
IΣ0 + Exp is unable to prove the Hilbert consistency of Q.
(6) Let LogK (z) denote the operation Log(Log...(Log(z))) — where K is an integer indicating the number of
iterations of Log here. Several articles [11,17,21,23,25,27,39,42] have credited some unpublished comments of
Robert Solovay for observing that for each integer K and definable cut Υ (x), there exists a thinning ϕ(x) of
Υ (x) where most (even weak) arithmetic axiom systems α can prove:
∀ p[ϕ(p) ⇒ ∃ qΥ (q) ∧ LogK (q) = p] AND
∀ p[ϕ(p) ⇒ ∃ r ϕ(r) ∧ LogK (r) = 2 · LogK p]. (10)
This never-published but often cited result by Solovay has been gainfully employed by a large part of the literature
on definable cuts. (A very nice proof of it appears on pages 172–173 of the Ha´jek–Pudla´k textbook [11].)
(7) As noted in Section 1, Robert Solovay privately communicated to us in April of 1994 that he knew how to
combine the formalisms of Nelson, Pudla´k and Wilkie–Paris [21,25,42] to prove Theorem 2, which can refine
the 1985 Pudla´k-like Incompleteness Effect — so it will apply to axiom systems recognizing merely successor
as a total function. To help publicize this never-published result, we published a proof of a weak version of
Theorem 2 — with attribution to our communications with Solovay — in Appendix A of our year-2001 article
[46]. This appendix’s result is not quite as strong as the broader version of Solovay’s Theorem 2, but it has the
virtue of having a pleasantly short 4-page proof.
(8) Paris–Dimitracopoulos [23] (and Pudla´k [25] using a different method) both observed that for an arbitrary initial
definable cut Υ , it is not always automatically feasible to construct a thinner cut ϕ that is closed under the
operation of Exponentiation.
(9) Characterizations of relative interpretability for finitely axiomatized sequential theories were independently
developed by Friedman and Pudla´k in [8,25]. See some papers by Smoryn´ski and Visser [31,37,40] for some
very detailed descriptions of these contributions by Friedman and Pudla´k.
(10) Let Conϕ(IΣ0) denote the variant of Eq. (9) where (1) α = IΣ0, (2) D designates the Hilbert deduction method
and (3) ϕ represents Eq. (9)’s employed definable cut. Krajı´cek [16] proved that for any IΣ0 cut Υ there exists a
thinner IΣ0 cut ϕ such that the theorem IΣ0+Conϕ(IΣ0)+ ¬ ConΥ (IΣ0) is consistent, and that an analog of this
construct holds for any finitely generated sequential theory under the Wilkie–Paris notion of a restricted proof
[42]. Visser [39] generalized this construct to show that many consistent axiom systems, such as Q, ACA0 and
GB Set Theory, have the property that no finite consistent extension of themselves implies there exists Hilbert-
style proofs of 0=1 from themselves simultaneously positioned in each of their definable cuts.
(11) Buss, Ignjatovic, Krajı´cek, Pudla´k and Takeuti [6,7,18,26,35] have explored the problem of separating Buss’s




2 , . . .. This problem is connected to a variety of open
questions about NP, the Polynomial Hierarchy and Cook’s system PV. Several of these articles have used the
properties of definable cuts in the course of their analysis. For example using the theory of definable cuts, Buss
and Ignjatovic [7] showed that PV is unable to confirm the consistency of its induction-free fragment, called
PV −.
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A small amount of additional notation is needed to describe one further development in proof theory. Let D denote
any deduction method such as Herbrand deduction, Hilbert deduction, semantic tableaux etc. Let D(α) denote the
classic Go¨del Diagonalization Sentence that states:
∗ There is no proof of this sentence from axiom system α using deduction method D.
Let Logλ(z) denote the operation Log(Log...(Log(z))) — where λ is an integer indicating the number of iterations of
Log here. Let ShortPrfλαD(x, y, z) denote a ∆
−
0 formula indicating that y represents a proof of the theorem x from
the axiom system α using deduction method D and that y = Logλ(z). Also, let λD(α) denote the generalization of
the D(α) sentence that has the ShortPrfλα,D(x, y, z) construct replace conventional deduction. This construct, called
a Generalized Go¨del Sentence, is defined formally as:
∗∗ In a context where one employs the “ShortPrfλα,D(x, y, z)” notation, there exists no code (y, z) that “proves”
this sentence.
Several articles have noticed how Generalized Go¨del sentences can serve as a helpful intermediate step for
developing a variety of generalizations and applications of the Incompleteness Theorem. This is essentially because
definable cuts are not always ideally suited for generalizing the Second Incompleteness Theorem when D represents
a cut-free deduction method, such as Herbrand deduction, semantic tableaux or the cut-free sequent calculus. Thus,
Takeuti [35] used generalized Go¨del sentences to analyze the 3-way relationship between the properties of NP, Buss’s
Bounded Arithmetic and some generalizations of Gentzen’s sequent calculus. Generalized Go¨del sentences have also
been used to answer a 20-year old Paris–Wilkie open question [24] about whether any extension of IΣ0 can prove its
own cut-free consistency. In this context, Adamowicz–Zbierski [1,3] used Generalized Go¨del sentences to show that
a cut-free version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem was valid at the level of IΣ0 + Ω1, Willard’s two papers
[45,47] strengthened this result to show that such a cut-free second incompleteness effect applied to all extensions of
IΣ0 and most extensions of Q, and Salehi [30] have recently explored some other types of interesting proofs of this
incompleteness effect.
One type of formalism that combines the theories of definable cuts and of Generalized Go¨del Sentences into a
hybridized framework can be found in [49]. It examines a hierarchy of several increasingly elaborate definitions
of semantic tableaux consistency, where one wishes to determine at what level in this hierarchy does the semantic
tableaux version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem become operative for axiom systems that recognize addition
(but not multiplication) as a total function. Via a hybridizing of the theory of definable cuts with the notion of a
Generalized Go¨del Sentence, [49] obtained an incompleteness result for this hierarchy.
Finally, let us return to Theorems 1 and 2 of Pudla´k and Solovay. Theorem 2 was described by Solovay as resulting
from the combined research efforts of himself and of Nelson, Pudla´k and Wilkie–Paris. It stated that no axiom
system can prove its own Hilbert consistency and also recognize successor as a total function. An important fact
is that Theorem 2 does not apply to semantic tableaux deduction, since our papers [43,46,48,51] had established that
semantic tableaux boundary-case exceptions to the Second Incompleteness Theorem can recognize addition as a total
function. Hence, there naturally arises the question to consider whether some type of axiom system, dropping the
assumption that successor is a total function, can recognize its own Hilbert consistency. Our Theorems 3, 4, 6 and 7
will partially answer this question by providing some closely matching positive and negative results.
3. Main notation conventions
This section will offer a brief summary of the formal notation used in this paper. An intuitive (but not formal)
description of the three incremental, additive and multiplicative naming conventions was provided by Eqs. (1)–(3)
in the Introduction Section. These equations should not be regarded as the formal definitions of these three naming
conventions because the addition and multiplication function symbols were employed in their recursive definitions.
To rectify this problem, we need to rewrite these equations in a language that has the grounding function symbols of
predecessor, subtraction and division-with-rounding replace the roles of addition and multiplication.
Our first task is to define the constant symbols C0, C1 and C2 to represent the integers of 0, 1 and 2. Since
Predecessor(0) = 0, this is done below:
Pred(C0) = C0 ∧ C1 = C0 ∧ Pred(C1) = C0 ∧ Pred(C2) = C1. (11)
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Next, let ADD(x, y, z) denote “z ≥ x ∧ z−x = y”, and MULT(x, y, z) denote [(x = 0∨ y = 0) ⇒ z = 0] ∧ [(x =
0∧ y = 0) ⇒ ( z
x
= y ∧ z−1
x
< y)]. These two∆−0 predicates do not technically use the Multiplication and Addition
function symbols, but a triple satisfies them only when respectively x + y = z and x ∗ y = z are true.
Finally, let j1, j2, j3 . . ., a1, a2, a3 . . . and b1, b2, b3 . . . denote the axiom sequences, used by our incremental,
additive and multiplicative naming conventions. The ADD(x, y, z) and MULT(x, y, z) predicates allow us to rewrite
the description of these axioms (from Eqs. (1)–(3)) in a revised language that replaces the Addition and Multiplication
function symbols with the operations of Predecessor, Subtraction and Division-with-rounding. Thus, the first formal
axiom of these three conventions (i.e. j1, a1 and b1) is defined by Eq. (11). For i ≥ 2 their additional axioms are:
ji =df ADD(Ci , 1, Ci+1) (12)
ai =df ADD(Ci , Ci , Ci+1) (13)
bi =df MULT(Ci , Ci , Ci+1). (14)
Let Bit(x, i) denote the i -th rightmost bit associated with the binary encoding of the integer x . Eq. (15) shows
how one can encode the term Bit(x, i) in our grounding function language as a compound function built out of the
grounding operations of count and subtraction:
Bit(x, i) = Count(x, i) − Count(x, i − 1). (15)
Let us recall that PredN (x) denotes an operation that consists of N iterations of the predecessor function (thereby
causing PredN (x) = x − N). Section 1 had defined our grounding function Log(x) to formally represent the integer
value of 1 + 	Log2x
. Let Ld denote an integer constant that represents the bit-length of the integer d’s binary
encoding, and let its binary representation be formally encoded by the bit sequence β1, β2 . . . βLd . In this context, let
σd (x) denote Eq. (16)’s ∆−0 formula. It has the characteristic that the only integer x satisfying (16) is the integer d
itself.
Bit(x, Log(x)) = β1 ∧ Bit(x, Pred(Log(x))) = β2 ∧ . . .∧
Bit(x, PredLd−1(Log(x))) = βLd ∧ PredLd−1(Log(x))) = 1. (16)
Since  Φ  denotes Φ’s Go¨del number, our notation convention will imply that the only integer x satisfying σΦ(x)
is Φ’s Go¨del number.
Our method for encoding Go¨del numbers is defined in Appendix A. This convention is ideally compact insofar as
its encoding of a particular sentence or proof will have a bit-length that is essentially proportional to the effort to write
down such an object by hand. Other examples of ideally-compact Go¨del encoding schemes have been described by
for example Ha´jek–Pudla´k and Wilkie–Paris in [11,42]. It is therefore probably unnecessary for a reader to examine
Appendix A in much detail. Essentially, Appendix A can be omitted provided the reader keeps in mind that the bit-
length needed for encoding the name of the symbol Ci , as well as for encoding the accompanying axioms ji , ai or bi ,
will have an ideally compressed O(Log(i + 1)) order of magnitude.
Our results also generalize in various forms for non-compressed encodings, where Ci has an O(i) bit-length
instead. We omit discussing these generalizations here because uncompressed encodings are inherently unnatural.
4. The ISCE formalism and its generalizations
This section will be devoted to proving Theorem 3 and defining its accompanying ISCE(A) formalism. In our
discussion, a Π−1 sentence will be called 2-reduced iff it uses only the constant symbols for the three natural numbers
0,1 and 2. This restriction is not serious because every unreduced Π−1 sentence has a 2-reduced counterpart that is
equivalent to it under Eq. (16)’s σ -formalism. For instance, if φ(a, b) is a 2-reduced∆−0 formula and if k¯ is an arbitrary
integer, then the unreduced Π−1 sentence “∀xφ(x, k¯)” is equivalent under the standard model to the 2-reduced Π−1
sentence below:
∀x ∀y{σk(y) ⇒ φ(x, y)}. (17)
A similar transformation is obviously available to map every unreduced Π−1 sentence onto its equivalent 2-reduced
counterpart. Moreover in the context of axiom systems that recognize the existence of an unending sequence of
natural numbers 0, 1, 2, . . . by using for example the additive naming convention, the 2-reduced sentence (17) is
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provably equivalent to its unreduced counterpart “∀xφ(x, k¯)”. Thus, there is no difficulty when we employ 2-reduced




The acronym “ISCE” will stand for Introspective Semantics with Continuous Expansion. It will be defined similarly
to [43,46]’s IS(A) and ISREF(A) axiom systems except that ISCE(A) will hybridize Section 1’s continuous expansion
property with an ability of a self-reflecting formalism to recognize its own Hilbert consistency. Given an initial axiom
system A, ISCE(A) will thus be defined to be a self-justifying axiom system, capable of proving all of A’s Π−1
theorems, and consisting of the following four axiom groups:
GROUP-ZERO: This axiom group will consist of the axiom sentences a1, a2, a3 . . . used by Eqs. (11) and
(13) of Section 3’s additive naming method. It differs from the Group-Zero axioms in our earlier papers
by using an additive (rather than incremental) naming method. (Note that additive naming is continuously
expanding, but incremental naming is not.)
GROUP-1: This group will consist of a finite set of Π−1 axioms defining ISCE’s grounding functions. This
means that for each grounding function G and set of numbers k, k1, k2, . . . , km , the combination of the
Group-Zero and Group-1 axioms will imply G(k1, k2, . . . , km) = k when this sentence is true. The Group-1
scheme will also assign the “=” and “<” predicates their usual logical properties. Any finite set of 2-reduced
Π−1 sentences that meet the preceding conditions is adequate. Table I of [46] provides one example of a
suitable set of Group-1 axioms.
GROUP-2: Let Φ denote Φ’s Go¨del number, and HilbPrfA(x, y) denote a ∆−0 formula indicating y is a
proof from axiom system A of the theorem x . Suppose that A uses the same grounding function symbols as
ISCE(A), and it therefore generates a set ofΠ−1 theorems. For each Π−1 sentence Φ, our prior papers had the
Group-2 schema contain an axiom of the form:
∀ y{HilbPrfA(Φ, y) ⇒ Φ}. (18)
The Group-2 axioms of ISCE(A) will have essentially the same format, except we cannot use exactly
Eq. (18)’s formal equation because ISCE’s language does not contain constant symbols for every natural
number. It is easy to overcome this difficulty by using Eq. (17)’s formalism for mapping an unreduced Π−1
sentence onto its 2-reduced counterpart. Thus, the effective equivalent for (18)’s Π−1 sentence is:
∀ y ∀ x{[σΦ(x) ∧ {HilbPrfA(x, y)] ⇒ Φ}. (19)
ISCE(A) will contain one such axiom for each 2-reduced Π−1 sentence Φ.
GROUP-3: ISCE(A)’s Group-3 axiom will consist of a single Π−1 sentence that essentially corresponds to
the following statement:
♠ “There is no Hilbert-style proof of 0=1 from the union of the Group-0, 1 and 2 axioms with THIS
SENTENCE (referring to itself)”.
We have already illustrated in several papers [44,46] how similar Kleene-like self-referential Π−1 constructions to
the sentence ♠ above were possible. In essence, the Π−1 encoding of ♠ rests on constructing a special ∆−0 formula
called “HilbPrf ISCE(A)(x, y)” such that Eq. (20) (below) can be roughly thought of as being semantically equivalent
to the sentence ♠. The exact details of how HilbPrf ISCE(A)(x, y) shall receive a ∆−0 encoding will be explained in
the course of Lemma 1’s proof.
∀x ∀y ¬ {σ0=1(x) ∧ HilbPrfISCE(A)(x, y)}. (20)
Lemma 1. There exists a ∆−0 encoding for the HilbPrf ISCE(A)(x, y) predicate which will cause Eq. (20)’s formal
mathematical sentence to be semantically equivalent to the content of the Group-3 statement ♠.
Proof sketch. Our justification of Lemma 1 will be somewhat abbreviated because analogous techniques were
previously used in our paper [46] to define its Group-3 axiom. In particular, let us employ the following notation:
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(1) Subst(g, h) will denote Go¨del’s classic substitution formula, which yields TRUE when h is a formula identical to
g — except that it replaces all g’s free variables with an integer term equal to g’s Go¨del number.
(2) UNION(A) will denote the union of ISCE(A)’s Groups 0, 1 and 2 axioms.
(3) HilbPrfUNION(A)(t, p) is a formula stating that p represents a Hilbert-style proof of the theorem t from the
axiom system UNION(A).
(4) ExtraPrfUNION(A)(t, h, p) is a formula stating that p represents a Hilbert-style proof of the theorem t from the
union of the axiom system UNION(A) with the additional axiom sentence whose Go¨del number is represented by
the integer h.
(5) FixPointPrf(t, g, p) will be an abbreviation for the sentence:
HilbPrfUNION(A)(t, p)∨
∃ h ≤ p[Subst(g, h) ∧ ExtraPrfUNION(A)(t, h, p)]. (21)
Appendixes B through D of our article [46] had explained in meticulous detail how one could use the theory of LinH
functions [11,17,52] to provide ∆−0 encodings for each of the formulae of Subst(g, h), HilbPrfUNION(A)(t, p) and
ExtraPrfUNION(A)(t, h, p). It therefore follows that Eq. (21)’s compound formula of FixPointPrf(t, g, p) also has a
∆−0 encoding. This in turn implies that Eq. (22) (below) has a Π−1 encoding:
∀x ∀y ¬ {σ0=1(x) ∧ FixPointPrf(x, g, y)}. (22)
The only free variable in Eq. (21) is g. Let Ψ (g) denote this formula, and θ denote Ψ (g)’s Go¨del number. Also, let
C∗ denote the particular constant employed by our additive naming convention that represents the least power of 2
greater than θ . Let θ denote a term whose value equals θ — where θ ’s encoding has a binary-like format with its
term beginning with the constant symbol C∗ and then subtracting the Log2θ or fewer needed powers of 2 smaller
than C∗, so that θ ’s exact value is produced. The Eq. (23)’s sentence can then be viewed as being the formal semantic
representation of either Eq. (20)’s sentence or the equivalent Group-3 statement ♠.
∀x ∀y ¬ {σ0=1(x) ∧ FixPointPrf(x, θ, y)}. (23)
Hence, this proof has confirmed Lemma 1’s claim by showing how one can view (23)’s “FixPointPrf(x, θ, y)”
predicate as being the ∆−0 formalization of (20)’s “HilbPrfISCE(A)(x, y)” formula — thereby causing Eq. (23) to
capture the semantic meaning of the statement ♠. 
Remark 2. The proof of Lemma 1 had assigned HilbPrf ISCE(A)(x, y) a∆−0 encoding because Lemma 1’s formalism
would become substantially less significant if this requirement was relinquished.
The formal statement of Theorem 3 was given in Section 1. It was essentially that the axiom system ISCE(A) will
be automatically consistent whenever:
1. All A’s Π−1 theorems are logically valid under the standard model, and
2. The formula HilbPrfA(x, y) has a ∆
−
0 encoding.
The proof of Theorem 3 is given below:
Proof. We will prove Theorem 3 by employing a proof-by-contradiction. If this theorem was false, then there would
exist an axiom system A satisfying conditions 1 and 2 (above) where ISCE(A) is inconsistent. In this context, let p
represent the minimal sized proof of 0 = 1 from ISCE(A).
Let G denote the Go¨del number of Eq. (20)’s Group-3 axiom sentence. Let k denote the least integer greater than
1+Log2(G) such that the additive naming convention’s particular axiom ak+1 does not appear inside the proof p.
Also, define the integer j to equal 2k . Consider a model-theoretic interpretation, Mkj , of the axioms appearing in p,
that has the following two properties:
(A) The interpretation Mkj will assume that Ci = 2i−1 when 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1 and that Ci = 0 when either i ≥ k + 2 or
i = 0.
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(B) The interpretation Mkj will assume no integer larger than j = 2k exists. By this we mean that both the “named
integers”, associated with explicitly denoted constant symbols C0, C1, C2, . . ., and also the “unnamed integers”
(which are not assigned a designated constant symbol) are presumed under the interpretation Mkj to assume values
no larger than j = 2k .
Since the additive naming convention’s i -th axiom ai causes Ci+1 = 2Ci , the model Mkj is obviously consistent with
all this convention’s axioms a1, a2, a3 . . . except for the axiom ak+1, which plainly violates Requirement-A.
Also because the grounding functions are non-growth functions, each 2-reducedΠ−1 sentence, which is valid under
the standard model, must be automatically valid also in the finite model Mkj . Thus, all the Group-1 axioms are valid in
Mkj . Also, all ISCE(A)’s Group-2 axioms are valid in the finite model Mkj because of the prior page’s Assumption-1
combined with the fact that ISCE(A)’s Group-2 axioms are 2-reducedΠ−1 sentences.
Let Z denote the set of all Group 0, 1 and 2 axioms except that the axiom ak+1 is excluded from the set Z . All
the axioms in Z were shown by the preceding two paragraphs to satisfy the model Mkj . However since p represents a
proof of 0=1, some axiom in p’s proof must be invalid in this model Mkj . This implies that Eq. (20)’s Group-3 axiom
must be automatically invalid in the model Mkj (because ak+1 does not appear in the proof p and some axiom inside
the proof p must violate Mkj ).
The invalidity of (20)’s Group-3 axiom under the model Mkj , in turn, implies there must exist a proof q from
ISCE(A) of 0=1 such that:
q ≤ j = 2k . (24)
We will now use Eq. (24) to prove q < p, a result that will finish our proof-by-contradiction (by contradicting the
initial assumption that p was the minimal proof of 0=1 from ISCE(A)). The preceding paragraph had demonstrated
how p’s proof of 0=1 had employed Eq. (20)’s Group-3 axiom as one of its essential steps. Let G again denote the
Go¨del number of this Group-3 axiom. Since Eq. (23)’s Group-3 axiom is a necessary step in p’s proof, it is obvious
that p’s bit-length is certainly more than three times the length of this Group-3 axiom (under all natural methods for
the Go¨del encoding of a proof, including the particular encoding methods we have sketched in Appendix A). Hence,
Eq. (25) formalizes this inequality:
Log2(p) > 3Log2(G). (25)
Moreover, let L denote the number of Group-zero axioms appearing inside the proof p. Then the quantity k (defined
in the second paragraph of this proof ) obviously satisfies the inequality:
k ≤ L + 1 + Log2(G). (26)
Under all usual encoding conventions, including the particular convention sketched in Appendix A, the number of
Group-zero axioms in p’s proof will be less than 13 Log2(p). (This is because every Group-zero axiom uses more than





In order to now finish our proof-by-contradiction, we must show that the combination of Eqs. (24)–(27) imply
that:
q < p. (28)
The justification of (28)’s inequality is quite trivial. It is because the presence of the factors “3” in Eq. (25) and 13 in
(27) assure (via Eqs. (24) and (26)) that Log(q) is no more than essentially 23 of the size of Log(p) (whenever p has
more than a tiny length of say roughly 100 bits).
Eq. (28)’s inequality q < p clearly contradicts our initial assumption that p was the minimal proof of 0=1 from
ISCE(A). Hence, our proof-by-contradiction has shown that Theorem 3 must be valid because otherwise the required
minimal size of the proof p will be violated. 
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Significance of Theorem 3. Part of what makes Theorem 3 interesting is that there is a tight match between this
theorem’s boundary-case exceptions to the Second Incompleteness Theorem and Theorem 4’s generalization for
it (because these two theorems differ only by replacing the former’s additive naming convention with the latter’s
multiplicative convention).
A second interesting aspect of ISCE(A) is that it satisfies a “continuous expansion property” (where the concerned
axiom system can be associated with a sequence of integers K1 < K2 < K3 < K4 . . ., such that the union of all the
axioms with Go¨del number less than Ki can be combined to prove the existence of an integer larger than Ki+1). What
makes this expansion paradigm especially interesting is that the sequence K1, K2, K3 . . . grows at a very fast rate as
its index goes to infinity. In particular, let 2i1 designate another way of writing the number 2
i
, and let 2im+1 denote the
quantity 22im . The sequence K1, K2, K3 . . . will actually grow faster than the elements in any sequence of the form
21m, 22m , 23m, . . ., for any fixed m. More precisely for a carefully chosen positive constant r < 1, ISCE(A)’s additive
naming convention will have its continuous expansion sequence grow at an essentially super-exponential rate which
satisfies (29)’s inequality:
Ki+1 > 2(Ki )
r
. (29)
There is also a third interesting facet of the ISCE(A) axiom system. For a prenex normal sentenceΨ , letΨ x denote
a sentence identical to Ψ except every previously unbounded universally quantified variable in Ψ x is bounded by x .
(All existential quantifiers and bounded universal quantifiers have their ranges unchanged under this definition.) Also
let TangPred(x) and TangDiv(x) denote the following two formulae:
a. TangPred(x) = {∃v x = v − 1}
b. TangDiv(x) = {∃v x < v2 }.
In a notation where Tangible(x) denotes either TangPred(x) or TangDiv(x), an axiom system α’s Tangibility
Reflection Principle for the sentence Ψ is defined to be the assertion:
∀x{[∃ y HilbPrfα(Ψ, y) ∧ Tangible(x)] ⇒ Ψ x }. (30)
Our prior papers [44,46] had illustrated two examples of self-justifying systems, called ISREF(A) and ISTR(A), that
could prove the correctness of their respective TangPred and TangDiv reflection principles for every prenex normal
sentence Ψ . These papers also explained why a system α’s ability to prove the validity of its tangibility reflection
principle for each sentence Ψ is a much stronger form of self-justifying assertion than α’s mere ability to prove the
non-existence of a proof of “0=1” from itself (see footnote1).
The term “incremental naming convention” had not appeared in our article [46]. However, its Theorem 3.4 had
implicitly presumed the presence of an incremental naming method, since its encoding convention had employed a
constant symbol with an O(Log(i + 2) ) bit-length for representing each integer i . It turns out that one can readily
generalize [46]’s formalism for the case where α employs Eq. (13)’s stronger additive naming convention instead of
the weaker incremental method. Thus by hybridizing Theorem 3’s proof with our earlier formalisms from Section 3
of [46], one can obtain:
Theorem 3*. Let us again use the assumptions from Theorem 3’s hypothesis that the axiom system A satisfies the
following two conditions:
1. All A’s Π−1 theorems are logically valid under the standard model, and
2. The formula HilbPrfA(x, y) will have a ∆−0 encoding.
Then it is possible to devise a consistent axiom system α that can simultaneously prove all A’s Π−1 theorems, verify
the correctness of its TangPred reflection principle and support the additive naming convention.
1 For instance, Theorem 7.2 from [46] shows that the analog of Eq. (30)’s reflection principle is typically infeasible when its Tangible(x) phrase
is removed. Thus, Eq. (30) is both more expressive than the mere statement that no proof of 0=1 exists, and it is close to the maximal type of
self-justifying statement feasible.
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In the interests of brevity, Theorem 3*’s proof shall not be presented here. This proof was omitted mostly because
it is a natural hybrid of Theorem 3’s proof with the added formalism that [46] used to prove its Theorem 3.4. A second
reason for focusing on the weaker but simpler version of Theorem 3 is that the contrast between the opposing positive
and negative results of Theorems 3 and 4 is easier to visualize under Theorem 3’s simpler version.
5. Incompleteness under the multiplicative naming convention
This section will discuss the incompleteness properties of an axiom system that employs Eq. (14)’s multiplicative
naming convention.
Definition 1. Let us recall Eq. (16) defined σn(x) to be a ∆−0 formula that was satisfied only when x corresponded
to the natural number n. Define HilbPrfα(x, y) to have a Concise Go¨del Encoding iff HilbPrfα(x, y)’s formula is ∆−0
and there exists a constant R > 0 and an accompanying finite subset F ⊂ α which satisfy the following two
invariants:
(I) ∀ p ∀ t If p is the proof of the theorem t from the axiom system α then ∃ q < 2pR where q is a proof from
axiom system F of:
∀ x ∀ y{σt (x) ∧ σp(y) ⇒ HilbPrfα(x, y)}. (31)
(II) Peano Arithmetic can formally prove that the triple (α, F, R) satisfies Item I’s requirements. (This added condition
is typically trivial to satisfy.)
It is easily verified that essentially all r.e. axiom systems have concise encodings. Indeed, Definition 1’s constraint
q < 2pR is somewhat excessive because q will typically have a much smaller magnitude. Theorem 4’s requirement
that α has a concise encoding is thus a very minor constraint.
It should also be noted that Definition 1’s formalism will be omitted when Appendix C sketches a proof of a
somewhat stronger version of Theorem 4.
Lemma 2. Let α denote any axiom system that can prove all Peano Arithmetic’sΠ−1 theorems and which also employs
the multiplicative naming convention’s axioms. Let σn(x) again be defined by Eq. (16). Then there will exist a constant
Kα (whose value depends only on α) such that there exists a proof from α of the sentence (32), whose length is bounded
by Kα + O(n3).
∃ z ∃ wσn(w) ∧ LogLog(z) ≥ w. (32)
Proof. For i ≥ 2 the multiplicative convention’s axiom bi (defined in Eq. (14)) indicates Ci+1 = Ci ∗ Ci . Thus, the
combination of the axioms b1, b2, b3 . . . bn+1 imply that Cn+2 = 22n . Hence, there exists some finite subset of Peano
Arithmetic’s Π−1 theorems, called say F, such that the union of F with b1, b2 . . . bn+1 provides a proof of Eq. (32),
such that this proof has no more than O(n2) lines and each line uses O(n) or fewer bits. This proof’s total bit-length
will thus be bounded by O(n3).
The full proof of (32) will thus have two parts. Its first half will use α to prove all the theorems of F . Its length is
represented by a constant Kα (whose value depends on α). The second half, outlined in the preceding paragraph, will
have an O( n3 ) size. Hence, the full proof has a Kα + O(n3) length. 
Remark 3. The analog of Lemma 2 is false if the additive naming convention replaces the multiplicative convention
in this lemma’s hypothesis. In particular, every proof of the existence of an integer N using the additive convention
will have a larger Go¨del number than N. In contrast, the multiplicative convention allows for the Go¨del number of
such proofs to have a sharply smaller magnitude than N (when for instance N = 22k and k is larger than some fixed
constant). In essence, this difference in magnitude is the reason the Second Incompleteness Theorem will generalize
under the multiplicative naming paradigm — while Section 4 showed boundary-case exceptions to it exist under the
additive naming convention.
Definition 2. Consider an encoding of the integer N that uses only the constant symbols from the multiplicative
naming convention and only the grounding functions of division and subtraction to encode N . There are of course an
infinite number of such encodings for N . In this section,
︷︸︸︷
N will denote the encoding of N with the minimal such
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Go¨del number (using Appendix A’s notation). For instance since the constant symbols of C1, C2 and C5 represent the
integers of 1, 2 and 256 under the multiplicative naming convention, the value
︷︸︸︷
125 is encoded as: [C5÷C2]−C1−C2.
Lemma 3. For any integer N, the bit-length for the encoding of
︷︸︸︷
N has an O[(LogN)2] or smaller magnitude.
Proof sketch. We will not provide a detailed justification of Lemma 3 here because it is both quite straightforward
and actually not technically needed to prove Theorem 4. (The latter is because if one replaces Lemma 3’s exponent 2
with any larger fixed positive constant, then a sufficient bound will be available to prove Theorem 4.) An abbreviated
justification of the underlying methodology needed to prove Lemma 3 is given below:
(1) If N is a power of 2, then
︷︸︸︷
N can be encoded by taking the multiplicative naming convention’s next higher
constant and dividing it by LogLog(N) or fewer smaller named symbols.
(2) Since any integer N can be encoded by taking the power of 2 that is larger than it and then subtracting Log(N)
or fewer smaller powers of 2, it follows from item 1 that each integer N can be encoded using no more than
O[Log(N)· LogLog(N)] appearances of named constant symbols.
(3) Because the i -th named constant symbol under Appendix A’s convention is encoded with O(Log(i)) bits and
because items 2’s constants Ci1 , Ci2 , . . . Cik have indices satisfying i j ≤Log(N), it follows that no more than
O[(LogN)2] bits are needed to encode
︷︸︸︷
N . 
Definition 3. Let Logλ z again denote Log(Log(Log. . . (Log(z)))) — where there are λ iterations of the logarithm
function. Section 2 had defined ShortPrfλα,D (x, y, z) to be a ∆
−
0 formula indicating y = Logλz and that y is a proof
of the theorem x from the axiom system α using the deduction method D. Whenever the subscript D is absent in this
notation (as for example in the formula “ShortPrfλα(x, y, z)”), our default assumption shall be that D denotes Hilbert
deduction. Also likewise, the symbol λ(α) will be an abbreviation for Section 2’s Generalized Go¨del Sentence

λ
D(α) (defined in its sentence **) — where again the omitted symbol D is taken by default to represent Hilbert
Deduction. Translated into the English language, λ(α) will thus be an abbreviation for the following sentence:
In a context where one employs the “ShortPrf λα(x, y, z)” proof notation, there exists no code (y, z) that “proves”
this sentence (looking at itself).
It is easy to assign λ(α) a formal Π−1 encoding by following Go¨del’s classic example. Thus, let Subst*(g, h) denote
the following∆−0 formula:
Subst*(g, h) = The integer g is an encoding of a formula, and h encodes a sentence identical to g, except that
all free variables in g are now replaced with Definition 2’s term
︷︸︸︷
g .
Then λ(α) is defined as the Π1 sentence Γ (
︷︸︸︷
n ), where Γ (g) denotes the formula in (33), n is its Go¨del number,
and
︷︸︸︷
n is a formal term representing n’s integer value.
∀h ∀y ∀z{Subst*(g, h) ⇒ ¬ ShortPrfλα(h, y, z)}. (33)
In Lemma 4, the symbol ⊥ denotes the Go¨del number of the sentence 0=1.
Lemma 4. Let α denote any axiom system satisfying Definition 1’s concise-encoding property. Suppose α can prove
all Peano Arithmetic’s Π−1 theorems, and α additionally includes all the multiplicative naming convention’s axioms.
Then there will exist some corresponding constant Lα such that Definition 3’s two formulae ShortPrf 2α (x, y, z) and






2(α), y, z) ⇒ ∃x < zHilbPrfα(⊥, x)}. (34)
Proof. Consider a sentence identical to (34), except that its clauses z >
︷︸︸︷
Lα and x < z are now removed. (Eq. (35)
illustrates this sentence.) We will first prove (35)’s validity in the standard model and then prove Lemma 4.
∀z ∀y{ShortPrf2α(
︷ ︸︸ ︷
2(α), y, z) ⇒ ∃xHilbPrfα(⊥, x)}. (35)
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We will prove (35) by assuming (y, z) satisfies ShortPrf 2α(
︷ ︸︸ ︷
2(α), y, z). Our proof will construct four substrings,
called x1, x2, x3, x4, such that their bit-wise concatenation represents the proof x whose existence is claimed by (35).
The formal definition of these four strings x1, x2, x3, x4 is as follows:
(1) The substring x1 will be simply the integer y. It will thus be a proof from α of 2(α).
(2) The substring x2 will be a proof from α that y proves 2(α). (Since Lemma 4’s hypothesis contains a conciseness
assumption, Definition 1 thereby implies x2 < 2y
R
, for a constant R whose value depends on α.)
(3) The substring x3 will be a proof from α that “∃v LogLog(v) = ︷︸︸︷y ”. (Lemma 2 assures x3 is sufficiently small
for Log(x3) ≤ Kα + O(y3), where Kα is a constant that depends only on α.)
(4) The substring x4 will combine the intermediate results from the preceding segments to derive the conclusion
“0=1”. It is easy for x4 to do this because x1 proved the diagonalizing theorem 2(α), which states essentially
that “there is no code (y, z) that is a proof of me”, while x2 and x3 proved precisely such y and z do exist. (The
length of x4 is inconsequential because it is much smaller than the lengths of x1, x2 and x3.)
This construction clearly shows that Eq. (35) is valid under the standard model of the natural numbers because the
integer x , that is the natural concatenation of the four substrings x1, x2, x3, x4, obviously satisfies the claim of Eq. (35).
Moreover, it is easy to extend our construction to also verify Eq. (34)’s slightly stronger claim. This is because we
can choose a constant Lα such that if z > Lα then each of the four preceding strings satisfy Log(xi) < 15 Log(z)
(see footnote2). Thus the natural concatenation of these four strings will consist of an element x that meets Eq. (34)’s
requirement for satisfying x < z. 
Corollary 1. The sentence (34) is also a theorem of Peano Arithmetic.
Proof sketch. The definition of Conciseness had included the Invariant II precisely so we could prove the current
corollary. In particular, the Invariant II states that the Invariant I is provable from Peano Arithmetic (in addition to
being logically valid). As a result, Lemma 4’s proof can be carried out in Peano Arithmetic. (The exact place we need
Invariant II in the preceding construction is in its step 2.) The other steps in Corollary 1’s proofs are the same as their
counterparts in Lemma 4’s proof; they need no justification here. 
Lemma 5. Suppose α is a consistent axiom system that satisfies Lemma 4’s hypothesis. Then Peano Arithmetic is able
to prove the following Π−1 sentence.
∀z ∀y{ShortPrf2α(
︷ ︸︸ ︷
2(α), y, z) ⇒ ∃x < zHilbPrfα(⊥, x)}. (36)
Proof. An intermediate step in our proof of Lemma 4 had shown Eq. (35) was valid under the standard model. Since
α is consistent, it immediately follows that (37) is also certainly valid under the standard model.
∀y ∀z ¬ ShortPrf2α(
︷ ︸︸ ︷
2(α), y, z). (37)
The validity of (37) is of course insufficient to assure that Peano Arithmetic can actually derive this sentence as a
theorem. However, it is well-known that Peano Arithmetic can prove every ∆−0 sentence that is valid. In particular,
Eq. (38) (below) is a ∆−0 sentence that differs from (37) by having the range of its universally quantified variables
bounded by Lemma 4’s constant Lα . Hence, the validity of (37) implies the validity of (38), which in turn implies that







2(α), y, z). (38)
2 Items 1–4 of the footnoted paragraph specified upper bounds on the lengths of the four strings x1, x2, x3 and x4. It also may be presumed
y =LogLog(z) because (y, z) satisfies the predicate ShortPrf 2α (
︷ ︸︸ ︷
2(α) , y, z). These observations trivially imply that we can choose a large
enough value for Lα such that each of the four xi automatically satisfy Log(xi ) < 15 Log(z) when z > Lα .
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Since ShortPrf2α(x, y, z) forces y < z, Peano Arithmetic can use (38) to get:
∀z ≤
︷︸︸︷
Lα ∀y ¬ ShortPrf2α(
︷ ︸︸ ︷
2(α), y, z). (39)
The combination of Corollary 1 and the preceding paragraph demonstrate that Peano Arithmetic can prove the
assertions of Eqs. (34) and (39). This implies Peano Arithmetic can also formally verify Eq. (36) (because it is an
immediate consequence of (34) and (39)). 
Theorem 5. Assume ShortPrfλα(x, y, z) and Definition 3’s formula Subst*(g, h) have∆−0 encodings. Suppose α is an
axiom system that has a capacity for proving all the ∆−0 sentences that are valid in the standard model of the natural
numbers. Also assume (for some fixed constant λ) that α has a capacity to prove the three theorems listed below. Then
α is inconsistent.
(A) ∀p ¬ HilbPrfα(⊥, p)
(B) {∃y∃zShortPrfλα(
︷ ︸︸ ︷
λ(α), y, z)} ⇒ ∃xHilbPrfα(⊥, x)
(C) ∀g∀h∀h∗{[Subst*(g, h) ∧ Subst*(g, h∗)] ⇒ h = h∗}.
Justification. We have put the proof of Theorem 5 into Appendix B because its justification is quite similar to
Theorem 2.3 that was proved in [47].
Let us recall that Theorem 4’s formal statement (from Section 1) stated that no consistent axiom system α can
prove a theorem corroborating its own Hilbert Consistency when it contains all the multiplicative naming convention’s
axioms, satisfies Definition 1’s “concise encoding” property and also retains an ability to prove all Peano Arithmetic’s
Π−1 theorems. The formal proof of this theorem is given below:
Proof. For the sake of constructing a proof-by-contradiction, let us temporarily assume Theorem 4 was false. Then
there would exist a consistent axiom system α satisfying Theorem 4’s hypothesis and the condition below:
α  ∀x ¬ HilbPrfα(⊥, x). (40)
Let λ = 2. It is then easy to establish (α, λ) satisfies the three requirements of Theorem 5’s hypothesis. The
justification of this claim is given below:
(1) Eq. (40) shows α can prove Theorem 5’s needed sentence (A).
(2) It is easy to apply Lemma 5 to establish α can also prove the sentence (B) from Theorem 5’s hypothesis. This is
because Lemma 5 shows that Eq. (36) is a theorem of Peano Arithmetic, and Theorem 4 ’s hypothesis indicated
that α had a capacity to prove all Peano Arithmetic’s Π−1 theorems. Hence, α can prove the validity of Eq. (36),
which in turn implies α can prove Theorem 5’s sentence (B) (because the latter with λ = 2 follows from Eq. (36)).
(3) Since Theorem 5’s sentence (C) is another of Peano Arithmetic’s Π−1 theorems, α can clearly prove (C).
Thus α satisfies Theorem 5’s three requirements, and this theorem then implies that α must be inconsistent. This latter
observation completes our proof-by-contradiction because it began by assuming α was consistent. 
A slightly stronger form of Theorem 4: For the sake of keeping our presentation in this section reasonably
short, Theorem 4 required its axiom systems α retain an ability to prove all Peano Arithmetic’s Π−1 theorems. The
Appendix C will sketch a proof of a more elaborate form of Theorem 4, called Theorem 4*, where α is neither required
to prove all Peano Arithmetic’sΠ−1 theorems nor to be concisely-encoded. Instead, its incompleteness result will state
that one can isolate one singleΠ−1 theorem W of Peano Arithmetic, such that no consistent r.e. axiom system α ⊃ W ,
employing the multiplicative naming convention, can verify its own Hilbert consistency.
Alternative naming conventions: The three most natural naming conventions are clearly the incremental,
additive and multiplicative conventions, defined by Eqs. (12)–(14). It is also possible to consider hybridized naming
conventions that lie midway between the additive and multiplicative conventions. For a fixed constant H and any
i ≥ 3, let Hybrid(H ) refer to a naming convention that defines Ci to equal  2 [ Log(i)]H  · Ci−1. This convention
can unify the formalisms of Theorems 3 and 4. Thus, Theorem 3’s partial exception to the Second Incompleteness
Theorem remains valid when one sets H = 1 under the Hybrid convention. Similarly by choosing a constant H > 1,
the Second Incompleteness effects under Theorems 4 and 4* can be generalized. This paper has focused on the
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additive and multiplicative naming conventions because they shorten the proofs for Theorems 3 and 4, and their
naming methodologies are also very natural.
Added comment. A more elaborate version of the proofs appearing in this section and Appendix C can generalize
these incompleteness results from Hilbert-style deduction to cut-free deductive methods, such as semantic tableaux
and Herbrand deduction.
6. Infinite far reach
An axiom system α is called Infinitely Far-Reaching iff there exists a finite subset of axioms S ⊂ α such that for
arbitrary N this fixed-and-finite set S is sufficient to prove ∃x PredN (x) = 1. This section will demonstrate Infinitely
Far-Reaching systems exist that are capable of recognizing their own Hilbert consistency. The ISINF(A) system,
defined in this section, will possess an unnatural quality because it will be Infinitely Far-Reaching without sustaining
an ability to prove successor is a total function. Nevertheless as a theoretical albeit highly artificial instrument,
ISINF(A) is useful because of its counter-intuitive nature.
Notation used in this section: As earlier in this paper, HilbPrfα(x, y) will denote that y is a Hilbert-style proof
of x from α. In our current discussion, JumpPrfα(x, y) will denote a second ∆−0 predicate, specifying that either
the bit-string encoding the integer 2y or the bit-string encoding 1 + 2y represents a Hilbert-style proof from α of the
theorem x . A key point is that if a∆−0 formula can identify α’s axioms, then JumpPrfα(x, y) will have a∆
−
0 encoding,
even if α does not technically recognize either successor or the operation of doubling are formally total functions. (In
essence, ISINF(A)’s counter-intuitive — albeit artificial — features will be due to this fact.)
Definition of ISINF(A): The system ISINF(A) will contain four axiom groups, similar to ISCE(A). Its Group-zero
axiom will simply indicate the existence of the first three natural numbers, called 0, 1 and 2. ISINF(A)’s Group-1 and
Group-2 axioms will have the same definitions as they did under ISCE(A). The novel aspect of ISINF(A) will be its
Group-3 scheme. Unlike our prior formalism, ISINF(A)’s Group-3 scheme will contain two axioms. These axioms,
formalized by Eqs. (41) and (42), will be defined simultaneously via the self-referencing methodology of the Fixed
Point Theorem. In essence, (41)’s fixed-point axiom will assert the ISINF(A) formalism is Hilbert-consistent. On the
other hand, Theorem 6 will prove that (42)’s axiom will make ISINF(A) Infinitely Far Reaching. (The symbol  x2 
in Eq. (42) will denote x divided by 2 with upwards rounding, and ⊥ will denote the Go¨del number of the sentence
0=1.)
∀ x ¬ HilbPrfISINF(A)(⊥, x) (41)
∀ x{[∀ y ≤  x
2
¬ JumpPrfISINF(A)(⊥, y)] ⇒ ∃ z x = z − 1}. (42)
We will not provide a formal encoding for (41) and (42)’s axioms because Lemma 1’s treatment of ISCE(A)’s
Group-3 axiom has direct analogs for both of these two axioms. Thus, HilbPrfISINF(A)(⊥, x) and the formula
JumpPrfISINF(A)(⊥, y) both have∆−0 encodings.
Theorem 6. Let A denote an arbitrary axiom system that satisfies the invariant conditions of:
i. Each of A’s Π−1 theorems is valid in the standard model, and
ii. The formula HilbPrf A (x, y) employed by ISINF(A)’s Group-2 scheme will have a ∆−0 encoding.
Then ISINF(A) will be both (1) consistent and (2) Infinitely Far-Reaching.
Proof of item 1. Suppose for the sake of establishing a proof-by-contradiction that item 1 was false. Then one could
construct a system A satisfying conditions (i) and (ii) where ISINF(A) is inconsistent. In this context, let p denote the
minimal-sized proof of ⊥from ISINF(A).
Our contradiction proof will have a structure similar to Theorem 3’s proof. We will therefore only sketch it. The
only method by which ISINF(A) can learn about the existence of any integer i ≥ 3 consists of repeatedly applying
Eq. (42)’s “Expansion Axiom” to successively construct the integers 3, 4, 5, . . . i . Thus if p is the smallest proof of
⊥, then j = 2 · 	 p2 
 − 1 ≤ p − 1 is the largest integer whose existence is implied by axiom (42).
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Let M j denote the finite model which assumes that the only integers which exist are the numbers 0, 1, 2, . . . j .
Since the previous paragraph indicated j = 2 · 	 p2 
 − 1 where p is the minimal proof of ⊥, the axiom (42) must be
valid in the model M j . Also, all ISINF(A)’s Group-zero, 1 and 2 axioms must be valid in the model M j , by the same
reasoning as was used in Theorem 3’s proof (see footnote3).
The main point is that since p is a proof of ⊥, some axiom in p ’s proof must be invalid in the model M j . This
implies axiom (41) is invalid in M j (because each other axiom used in p ’s proof is valid in M j ). This contradicts p’s
presumed minimality by implying that a smaller q ≤ j < p is also a proof of ⊥. Hence item 1 is true because its
negation is contradictory. 
Proof of item 2. Essentially a trivial consequence of the combination of item 1 with axiom (42)’s formal structure.
In particular, let φ(x) denote the expression enclosed by the square brackets of (42). This expression is ∆−0 because
JumpPrfISINF(A)(⊥, y ) was. The key point is that every logically valid ∆−0 formula γ (c) has the property that
ISINF(A) is capable of proving γ (c) for any integer c whose formal existence is known to ISINF(A). Thus, (42)’s
square bracket expression has this property. Hence ISINF(A) can combine axiom (42) with φ(c)’s verification property
to automatically infer the existence of a larger constant c + 1 from the existence of c . Thus, ISINF(A) is Infinitely
Far-Reaching because it can learn of the existence of any natural number n by applying n − 2 iterations of the
preceding rule. 
Generalizations of Theorem 6 and its significance. The system ISINF(A) is awkward because of the appearance
of the two different proof predicates “HilbPrfα(x, y)” and “JumpPrfα(x, y)” in its Group-3 axioms. A second
drawback is that ISINF(A) appears to be incompatible with the tangibility reflection principles (defined at the end of
Section 4). It is thus quite unlike ISCE(A), which was fully compatible with the tangibility reflection principles (via
Theorem 3*). As a whole, ISCE(A) is thus preferable over ISINF(A). One reason ISINF(A) is partially interesting,
despite its awkward nature, is that it seems to clarify the meaning of Theorems 1, 2 and 4, by Pudla´k, Solovay and
ourselves. In particular, it shows that these generalizations of the Second Incompleteness Theorem do not technically
apply to all formal axiom systems with Infinite Far Reach.
There is also a second interesting facet of Theorem 6’s formalism that was brought to our attention in the form of
an open question from Pavel Pudla´k. Let us call F(x) an Extender Function iff it satisfies axioms (43) and (44).
∀x ∀y x = y ⇒ F(x) = F(y) (43)
∀x F(x) = 0. (44)
It is easy to construct a finite set of Π−1 axioms, called say S, such that the union of S with the two axioms from
Eqs. (43) and (44) constitutes an axiom system of Infinite Far Reach. The study of axiom systems that employ such
extender functions was initiated by Ajtai [4] during his investigation of various generalizations of the Pigeon Hole
Principle. In this context, Pudla´k’s question was whether one could use an Extender Function to construct a self-
justifying axiom system of Infinite Far Reach.
In order to present one formalized version of this open question, let us define IS.Extender(A) to be an axiom system
identical to Section 4’s ISCE(A) formalism except for the following changes:
(1) The IS.Extender(A) formalism will contain an extra function symbol F , and its Group-1 axiom class will contain
the two additional axiom sentences listed in Eqs. (43) and (44). (No change will be made among IS.Extender(A)’s
Group-2 axioms; they will thus not discuss any further properties of the newly created function symbol F .)
(2) The Group-3 axiom of IS.Extender(A) will be identical to ISCE(A)’s Group-3 Kleene-like “I am consistent axiom”
except that the pronoun “I” will now refer to a revised system that contains the two additional axiom sentences
given in Eqs. (43) and (44).
Based on the fact that Theorems 3, 3* and 6 discuss three close cousins of IS.Extender(A) that are automatically
consistent when A is consistent, it is reasonable to conjecture that IS.Extender(A) has a similar consistency property.
Pavel Pudla´k, in private communications, noticed that if IS.Extender(A) satisfied this consistency condition, then it
3 Section 4 defined “2-reduced” Π−1 sentences and noted every “2-reduced” Π
−
1 sentence is automatically valid in each finite model M j having
j ≥ 2 when it is valid in the standard model of the natural numbers. Since each of ISINF(A)’s Group-zero, 1 and 2 axioms are such 2-reduced Π−1
sentences, their validity under M j is thus immediately assured.
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would be a significant generalization of Theorem 6’s self-justifying system. (This is because IS.Extender(A) employs
a more natural form of Infinite Far Reach than ISINF(A).) The purpose of this paragraph is thus to bring to the research
community’s attention this interesting question, raised by Pudla´k.
For the sake of clarity, it should be noted that if one were to supplement Eqs. (43) and (44) with Eq. (45)’s further
axiom, then a generalization of the Second Incompleteness Theorem will be activated.
∀x ∀y x < y ⇒ F(x) < F(y). (45)
In particular, Theorem 7 formalizes this effect.
Theorem 7. There exists a Π−1 theorem W of Peano Arithmetic such that no consistent axiom system α can
simultaneously prove W, prove the validity of the sentences in Eqs. (43) through (45) and prove a theorem verifying
its own Hilbert consistency.
Appendix D sketches a proof for Theorem 7 that essentially corroborates Theorem 7 by a reduction argument to
the earlier results of Theorems 1 and 2 by Pudla´k and Solovay [25,32]. As Appendix D explains, there is one added
complication in proving Theorem 7, which did not arise in the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 by Pudla´k and Solovay.
After overcoming this problem, Appendix D will then finish Theorem 7’s proof by applying the earlier methods that
[25,32] had previously used to prove their Theorems 1 and 2.
Theorem 7 is interesting partly because it shows that axiom systems only slightly stronger than IS.Extender(A)
are known to obey the Hilbert-style version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. Thus if IS.Extender(A) turns
out to be a self-justifying axiom system, then it will represent close to the maximal type of such a formalism
that is feasible under at least Hilbert style deduction. An interesting open question to determine is where between
Theorem 6’s boundary-case exception to the Second Incompleteness Theorem and Theorem 7’s generalization of it
does the Is.Extender(A) formalism lie?
7. Concluding remarks
The sharp contrast between the positive and negative results of Theorems 3 and 4 is the main result of this paper. In
combination, these propositions indicate the Second Incompleteness Effect for Hilbert-style deduction can be evaded
when an axiom system employs the additive naming convention, although it becomes operative when the multiplicative
convention is present.
These results differ from our prior study of semantic tableaux deduction because [43,46,48,51] used axiom systems
that could simultaneously recognize their own semantic tableaux consistency and addition as a total function. On the
other hand, Theorem 2 by Solovay [32] showed that no analog of this paradigm for Hilbert-styled deduction can even
recognize successor as a total function. To evade the obstacle that was formalized by Solovay’s theorem, our ISCE(A)
formalism has thus replaced the conventional axiom declaring addition is a total function with an additive naming
convention.
Section 4’s ISCE(A) axiom system is of interest also because it satisfies a “continuous expansion property” —
where the concerned axiom system is associated with a sequence of integers K1 < K2 < K3 . . . such that the union
of all the axioms with Go¨del number less than Ki can be combined to prove the existence of an integer greater than
Ki+1. This construct is weaker than an axiom declaring successor is a total function. However, it allows ISCE(A) to
retain at least some weak notion of an infinite growth among integers. Indeed, Eq. (29) has shown that ISCE(A)’s
continuous expansion sequence grows at a very fast super-exponential rate. Our chief results are thus that this rapid
growth of ISCE(A)’s additive convention is compatible with a boundary-case exception to the Second Incompleteness
Theorem for Hilbert-style deduction, while the stronger multiplicative naming conventions (of Theorems 4 and 4*)
will reactivate the Second Incompleteness Theorem.
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Appendix A: Summary of Go¨del encoding method
This appendix will briefly summarize our formal method for generating Go¨del numbers for logical sentence and
proofs. This encoding scheme will be roughly analogous to the natural B-adic encoding methods described by Ha´jek–
Pudla´k [11] and Wilkie–Paris [42] — insofar as the number of utilized bits to encode a semantic object will be
approximately proportional to the length of such an expression written by hand.
Our encoding scheme will use the following 20 language symbols to formalize a logical sentence or proof:
(1) The standard connective symbols of ∧, ∨, ¬ , ⇒, ∀ and ∃.
(2) The left and right parenthesis symbols, and also a comma symbol.
(3) Seven function symbols for representing the seven grounding functions of subtraction, division, logarithm, etc.
(4) The relation symbols of “=” and “≤”.
(5) The symbol Vˆ for designating the presence of a basic variable symbol.
(6) The symbol Cˆ for designating the presence of a constant symbol C .
Let a byte denote an unit of six bits. Define a proof as being either a sequence of bytes (or equivalently being an
integer, written in base 64). Each of the 20 symbols (above) will be given some unique 6-bit code, ranging between
32 and 51. Our method for representing the presence of the i -th variable vi will be to encode it is as a string of
log32(i +1)+1 bytes, where the first byte is the “Vˆ ” symbol and the remaining bytes encode i as a base-32 number.
The same convention will be used to denote the presence of the i -th constant symbol Ci except its first byte will be the
“Cˆ” symbol. (This method for encoding the name of the i -th constant symbol in a digital-like format is the reason that
Sections 1 and 3 had stated that the i -th constant symbol’s name would have the important needed O( Log(i + 1) )
bit-length.)
Our byte-styled encoding method will produce proof strings whose length is approximately proportional to the
effort to write down such a proof by hand. There are many analogs of such types of encodings in the prior literature
(see for example the Ha´jek–Pudla´k textbook [11]). Such compressed encodings are usually considered to be preferable
and more efficient than an uncompressed encoding method, using say the Chinese Remainder Theorem [20]. All our
theorems have analogs under such uncompressed encoding methods, but they are substantially more meaningful when
one uses efficiently compressed encodings.
Appendix B: Sketch of Theorem 5’s proof
Theorem 5’s formal statement is similar to article [47]’s Theorem 2.3, except that it discusses Hilbert deduction
rather than semantic tableaux deduction. We will therefore provide only a sketch of Theorem 5’s proof.
Proof sketch. Let ∗ denote the “diagonalizing” sentence defined below:

∗ =df {∀ y ∀ z ¬ ShortPrfλα(
︷ ︸︸ ︷
λ(α), y, z)}. (46)
Consider the sentences (A) and (B) from Theorem 5’s hypothesis. From the definitions of (A) and (B), it is trivial that
“A ∧ B  ∗”. Since (A) and (B) are provable from α, we get:
α  ∗. (47)
It is clear that λ(α) and ∗ are equivalent sentences under sufficiently strong models of arithmetic. However, we
need more than this fact to prove Theorem 5. We need to establish that a weak axiom system α (satisfying Theorem 5’s
hypothesis) can also recognize this equivalence.
To establish this last fact, let
︷︸︸︷
n again denote (33)’s Go¨del number, encoded with Definition 2’s overbrace




λ(α)) is true. This implies (48) because Theorem 5’s
hypothesis indicates α can prove all logically valid∆−0 sentences.
α  Subst*(︷︸︸︷n ,
︷ ︸︸ ︷
λ(α)). (48)
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λ(α)), Θ represent the sentence (C) in Theorem 5’s hypothesis, and Ξ be the identity λ(α) ≡ ∗.
For theseΛ,Θ andΞ , it is easy to infer that α  Λ∧Θ ⇒ Ξ (becauseΛ∧Θ enables α to immediately deduce that the
only value for h satisfying Subst*(
︷︸︸︷
n , h) is the quantity λ(α)). Thus since α can prove Λ, Θ and Λ ∧Θ ⇒ Ξ ,
we get:
α  λ(α) ≡ ∗. (49)
Also, the combination of Eqs. (47) and (49) trivially implies that
α  λ(α). (50)
The justification of Theorem 5 will now be finished by applying the roughly classic paradigm where a proof
formally verifies the statement that: “There is no proof of me”. In particular, let p denote the proof of λ(α). (Note
that p’s existence is assured by Eq. (50).) Choose a second integer q satisfying Logλ(q) = p. Let r denote the Go¨del
number of the sentence λ(α). Also, if
︷︸︸︷
n represents (33)’s Go¨del number, then λ(α) is encoded as:
∀h ∀y ∀z{Subst*(︷︸︸︷n , h) ⇒ ¬ ShortPrfλα(h, y, z)}. (51)
The key point is that Eq. (51) must be false because if one replaces its three variables y, z, and h with the three
constants p, q, and r then (51)’s formal statement is clearly negated (via the usual diagonalization argument). Since
Theorem 5’s hypothesis indicates α has a capacity to prove all valid∆−0 sentences, it clearly must also have a capacity
to refute any Π−1 sentence that is invalid in the Standard Model. Hence, we obtain:
α  ¬λ(α). (52)
The combination of (50) and (52) shows that α is inconsistent. 
Appendix C: An alternate version of Theorem 4’s result
Theorem 4* (proven in this appendix) will differ from Section 5’s Theorem 4 essentially by isolating a particular
Π−1 theorem W of Peano Arithmetic that serves as a threshold for activating the Second Incompleteness Theorem
when the multiplicative naming convention is present. Our proof of Theorem 4* will be an incremental modification
of Theorem 4’s proof. It will therefore be kept very brief. It will use the following notation:
(1) An axiom system α will be called Finitely Generated iff there exists a finite list of axioms φ1, φ2, . . . , φn , such
that α consists of the union of these n axioms with the infinite set of axioms of b1, b2, b3 . . . employed by the
multiplicative naming convention. In this case, Base(α) will denote the byte-sequence encoding the axiom list:
“φ1, φ2, φ3, . . . , φn”. Also, A will denote Base(α)’s “Go¨del number”.
(2) FinGenPrf(A, t, p) will denote a∆−0 formula which states that p is a Hilbert-style proof of the theorem t from a
finitely generated axiom system whose particular Go¨del number is identified by the integer A.
Lemma 6. There exists a Π−1 theorem V of Peano Arithmetic and an exact formalization M for encoding
FinGenPrf(A, t, p) as a ∆−0 formula such that no consistent, finitely-generated axiom system α may contain both




Lemma 6’s proof is not provided here because the same basic techniques that Section 5 used to prove its Theorem 4
will also corroborate Lemma 6. Thus, the intuition behind Lemma 6 is quite simple: It is that if one is allowed the
freedom to pick the most amenable available ∆−0 encoding for the formula FinGenPrf(A, t, p), henceforth denoted
as M , and also given the freedom to choose a sufficiently strong accompanying Π−1 sentence V , then these two
extra degrees of freedom will allow one to easily modify Section 5’s proof of Theorem 4 to additionally corroborate
Lemma 6’s statement.
Lemma 6 will be interesting because it turns out that after one has established its validity, for just one specialized
form of∆−0 encoding of the FinGenPrf(A, t, p) predicate, a significantly more general result can be derived — whose
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formalism is independent of the utilized ∆−0 encoding and which also applies to essentially all axiom systems of
infinite cardinality as well. One further definition will help explore this point.
Definition 4. Let β denote a finitely-generated axiom system and α denote a recursively enumerable axiom system
that is not necessarily finitely-generated. In this context, β will be called a Base-Subset of α iff all β’s axioms are
axioms of α.
Lemma 7. There exists a Π−1 sentence V ∗ such that the union of V ∗ with the multiplicative naming convention’s
axioms can prove Eq. (54) whenever (using Definition 4’s notation) β is a base-subset of α.
∀t ∀p[FinGenPrf(
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Base(β), t, p) ⇒ HilbPrfα(t, p)]. (54)
Definition 4 makes it quite easy to construct a Π−1 sentence V ∗ which satisfies Lemma 7’s requirements. We will
omit the construction of V ∗ here because our goal is to keep this appendix very brief.
Definition 5. The symbol W will denote aΠ−1 sentence that is the conjunction of the two sentences V and V ∗ (defined
by Lemmas 6 and 7).
Theorem 4* (A Strengthened Version of Theorem 4’s Result). No consistent recursively enumerable axiom system α
which contains Definition 5’s axiom W as well as the multiplicative naming convention’s axioms can prove a Π−1
theorem indicating the non-existence of a proof of 0=1 from itself.
Proof. For the sake of establishing a proof-by-contradiction, let us assume Theorem 4* was false. Then some
consistent recursively enumerable axiom system α will satisfy Theorem 4*’s hypothesis and be able to prove its
own Hilbert consistency.
Let p denote such a proof of α’s consistency, and γ denote the finite subset of axioms from α that appears in the
proof p. Also, let β denote the union of γ with the combination of the Π−1 sentence W and with all the multiplicative
naming convention’s axioms.
Then β is a finitely-generated system (because γ had finite cardinality). Since the first paragraph of this proof had
presumed α was consistent and because β ⊂ α, it follows that β must also be certainly consistent. Hence, β satisfies
the two requirements of Lemma 6’s hypothesis. This lemma will thus imply that β is unable to prove its own Hilbert
consistency.
We will now complete our proof-by-contradiction by proving the statement + below (which contradicts the
preceding paragraph’s final sentence):
+ The axiom system β can verify its own Hilbert consistency.
We will use Lemma 7 to prove +. This lemma implies that any finitely-generated axiom system, containing V ∗, has
the ability to infer β’s consistency from α’s consistency. Also, V ∗ is provable from γ because γ ’s definition indicated
it includes the axiom W (and because Definition 5 indicated that W includes the clause V ∗). These facts imply that β
must be able to verify its own Hilbert consistency because γ (which is a subset of β) possesses an ability to verify the
consistency of α (which is a superset of β). Hence, Lemma 7 certainly implies the validity of +.
The combination of the preceding proofs of + and of +’s negation enables our proof-by-contradiction to reach its
desired end by showing an unavoidable contradiction will occur if Theorem 4* is false. 
Added comment: The only significant difference between Theorems 4 and 4* is that the latter isolates a particular
Π−1 sentence W that acts as an uniform threshold for activating the multiplicative naming convention’s version of
the Second Incompleteness Theorem. This appendix’s proof for Theorem 4* was written in a highly abbreviated style
essentially because Section 5 had already proved the only slightly weaker Theorem 4.
Also, it should be noted that Theorem 4*’s requirement that α contain the Π−1 sentence W as an axiom can be
replaced by a milder constraint that α merely retain an ability to prove some fixed and pre-specifiedΠ−1 theorem W∗.
Appendix D: Sketch of Theorem 7’s proof
This appendix will sketch a proof of Theorem 7 by employing Theorems 1 and 2 of Pudla´k and Solovay as the
main interim step that is needed to corroborate Theorem 7. The key challenge in proving Theorem 7 can be realized
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when one considers the possibility that we could plausibly be examining a non-standard model M of the set of natural
numbers where the extender function F satisfies the following two conditions:
(1) F(x) = x + 1 when x is a standard integer, and
(2) F(x) = x − 1 when x is any non-standard number.
Such a function F is consistent with the axioms from Eqs. (43) through (45). However, this particular function F (and
many other examples) will grow at a slower rate than the successor function. Our strategy will thus be to find a way to
apply the machinery of Theorems 1 and 2 of Pudla´k and Solovay to prove Theorem 7 despite the added complication
that F could be plausibly growing at a slower rate than the successor function.
To overcome this difficulty, let Ψ (x) denote the following formula
∀ t ≤ x F(t) > t . (55)
Also, let us assume that Theorem 7’s Π−1 sentence W is a conjunction of several Π−1 clauses W1, W2, . . . Wn where
its first three clauses W1, W2 and W3 are defined below:
∀ g ∀ h∃ i ≤ h[g < h ⇒ g = i − 1] (56)
∀a ∀b ∀c ∀d[a < b < d ∧ c − 1 = a] ⇒ c < d (57)
∀a ∀b ∀c[a ≤ b ∧ b ≤ c] ⇒ a ≤ c. (58)
Then by essentially utilizing Eqs. (44), (45) and (56)–(58) as helpful intermediate steps, Theorem 7’s axiom system α
can prove that the formula Ψ (x) has the central properties of a definable cut. By this, we mean that α can prove that
Ψ (x) satisfies the following three conditions:
A. Ψ (0)
B. ∀ pΨ (p) ⇒ ∃q[Predecessor(q) = p ∧Ψ (q)]
C. ∀p∀ q[q < p ∧Ψ (p)] ⇒ Ψ (q).
The central point is thus that although the axiom system α may lack the power to recognize that successor is a total
function in a formally global sense, it will be able to apply the conjunction of Eqs. (44), (45), (56) and (57) to infer
the validity of item B (above) — which essentially states that the operation of successor is indeed a total function in a
local sense among the set of integers x that satisfy the condition Ψ (x).
Once we have established the preceding condition, the remainder of Theorem 7’s proof can rest on a reduction
argument that applies essentially the formal machinery that Pudla´k and Solovay used to prove Theorems 1 and 2. By
this we mean that if α could prove the sentence ∀ p ¬ HilbPrfα(0 = 1, p) then it could clearly also verify Eq. (59)’s
assertion (which essentially states that no integer p satisfying Ψ (p) is a proof of 0=1).
∀ p[Ψ (p) ⇒ ¬ HilbPrfα(0 = 1, p)]. (59)
Since items A–C establish Ψ is functionally equivalent to a definable cut, the prior mathematical machinery from the
literature about definable cuts can then finish the proof of Theorem 7, in the same manner that Pudla´k and Solovay
previously used it to prove Theorems 1 and 2. In particular, this method will establish that no consistent axiom system
α ⊃ W can prove its own consistency — because otherwise α would then also prove Eq. (59) — a result which would
render α automatically inconsistent.
In summary, this appendix was kept abbreviated because it sought to only summarize how the methods of Pudla´k
and Solovay can be used to prove Theorem 7’s statement, even in the extreme case where α does not recognize
successor as a total function. It has shown α can prove Ψ (x) satisfies conditions A–C, thus making the Pudla´k–
Solovay paradigm applicable.
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